Stalin and Collectivization

Section by S. Mironin

In an article on the New Economic Policy, I have tried to prove that Stalin took their decisions in a completely hopeless situation, that the decision to start industrialization was connected with the need to ensure, in accordance with the objectives formulated DI Mendeleev, the continuation of the development of an independent Russia. I wanted to demonstrate two approaches. One – theorizing based on the primacy of a certain theory, divorced from reality (Trotsky and other oppositionists) and the second – a pragmatic, empirical, based on deep analysis of reality and the control system (Stalin). These two faced during decision-making on collectivization. About what really happened at that time, almost no reliable information. There is only myths – the Marxist and liberal. In this article I want to show how easy and at the same time it was necessary to decide on collectivization.


By the mid-20s. reduction potential of the pre-revolutionary industry capital was exhausted. Its further development required new investments, a dramatic expansion of industrial construction that has made the task of industrialization a priority in the country’s economic development in the second half of the 20-ies.

Therefore, to maintain the country’s sovereignty in the XIV-th Congress of the CPSU (b) (December 1925) embarked on industrialization. The rate of industrialization were identified sufficiently high.

The Stalinist system of economic management was another means to modernize our state’s economy, which was conceived as the creation of a powerful military-industrial complex and modern technological nucleus consisting of enterprises of heavy industry. Interestingly, the main elements of the Stalinist system, we find even under the tsarist regime. Command-administrative system in heavy and especially the military industry, the regulation of prices of basic commodities, the central planning process runs.

Lower relative prices for energy and other raw materials (which Russia could afford, because it had its own readily available resources), were still in tsarist times way to encourage industry to compensate unfavorable climate. In particular, it is the low oil prices make more profitable rapid transition from manual labor and horse-drawn traction to the mechanization of agriculture.

However, Russia did not have the necessary technology to solve the problem of industrialization, so the home could be carried out with respect to the further development of a small group of modernized production, laid before the First World War. Therefore, the task of modernization could only be solved by importing modern technology from the West. State power the Bolsheviks opened a fundamentally new way of planned industrialization. Knowing the parameters of the major Western technology, it was possible to transfer them to the Soviet soil, carrying out comprehensive centralized procurement technology abroad. It catching character of industrialization, I repeat, in general, the most successful of the already proven technological solutions of the West, led to the success of large-scale planning in physical terms. Roughly speaking, the planners know how many and what products need to be made in this year for the production of certain products in the next year – before the eyes of the Western experience has been well-established, close to the optimum parameters of technological chains.

Forced to focus on the export of grain and raw materials led to a significant destruction of industries in the consumer sector, from agriculture to industry of consumer goods. But at the same time it started very fast and dynamic modernization process. It was based on intensive labor majority of the population, even the officials working days.

The sharp decrease in the share of consumption in total product has allowed for a brief period to accumulate huge capital and produce something unprecedented – to make a technological leap and almost catch up with the West on key parameters of technological development. Accumulation artificially increased to the maximum level. The country has been aimed at the creation, rather than the petty-bourgeois consumption. Think of movies and books on that stage: often it seems that only the workers worked and slept. Subsequently, this mighty modernization allowed the country to withstand the invasion of Europe and win the Great Patriotic War.

The most important issue to light in connection with the import of technology, is the following: why the Western countries allowed their companies to transfer technology of USSR, undermining its monopoly? I think there are several intertwined factors.

First, the USSR was guided by the autarkic development. Americans knew that the Soviet Union still does not have the money to buy American tractors, but he and export them after the construction at tractor plants will not be. Therefore, the Americans have nothing to lose, transferring its technology to the Soviet Union, but it was for them at least some market against the backdrop of the Great Depression.

Second, the Soviet Union has skillfully used the heterogeneity of the West by buying technology, primarily in the US and Germany – the most industrialized countries, which at the same time, there was a huge colonial empires and which was particularly needed the voluntary exchange of goods with other countries.

Thirdly, It’s clear that before the Second World War, no one took seriously Soviet Russia as a threat to the well-being of the West. Perhaps it was a great achievement of the then foreign policy, with the result that, despite the Comintern’s phrase, the country was able to gradually make a big leap, without causing anyone’s fear. A Comintern propaganda was also needed, but in order to win the sympathy of other countries, to increase the number of supporters of the Soviet Union, to recruit scouts, etc. Experience technology imports in the 30’s can be concluded in the case of regular upgrades: not all of their technology the West will “sit like a dog in the manger.”

Not everything went smoothly in the years of industrialization. By carelessness, gross negligence and because of sabotage often stolen by a unique technological equipment. To raise the quality of work, December 9, 1933 was introduced criminal liability for the production of low-quality products. Unpreparedness of the country to the momentary perception of new technologies has been largely due to both staff shortages and human factors. Unable to learn new routines at once. Often it turns out that imported technology is unsuitable in the Russian context and needs some work, what do not have enough skills and resources. The article Shpotova [2] on technical assistance West Soviet industrialization describes many similar cases and their striking similarity in principle to problems when the first Russian industrialization with Alexis described in the monograph L.V.Milova [3]. Apparently, the difficulties due to unavailability inevitable in any version of catch-up development and to minimize and overcome the need extraordinary persistence managers and subordinates, strict accountability and their ownership without barriers initiative.

As correctly noted A.Vishnevsky [4], all the early advocates of industrialization arguments (such as existed ever since the establishment of Soviet power) dominated technocratic notes, important place was given to the material and technical innovation, social innovation is seen as something secondary, automatically grows out “material and technical basis.” Widely known, for example, the words of Lenin that communism – it is Soviet power (it has been) plus electrification of the whole country.

The first five-year plan set ambitious goals in the field of people’s livelihood. Provision of basic consumer goods, including food, expected to increase over the five-year period is not less than two or three times.

The Stalinist economy at the time was to find ways to ensure a huge inflow of labor in the production of priority. But it is not necessary to represent the matter as if industrialization owes some miracle, in which cease to fulfill the laws of economics, if all economic activities directed some teams money completely ceased to be money, goods and products. No, as in any country in the USSR there was a market within the limits of certain cultural characteristics and decisions the country’s leadership (including command). With the exception of the Gulag, people were hired on a construction site voluntarily, for a salary, the amount of which was subject to the laws, true to the “market” economy. Thus, downward pressure on urban wages went by increasing the supply of labor. Thus, by the hard pressure on the village Stalin managed to temporarily remove the restriction on the rate of industrialization, which existed under Stolypin. [5]


It quickly became clear that funds for industrialization is not there. And, as I wrote in the first article, the money for the modernization of the industry lacked from the beginning of the NEP. Industrialization only sharply aggravated old sores. The main problem that arose during the beginning of industrialization, – where to find funds for mass industrial construction. And the money for industrialization is urgently needed.

Cause of acute and constant lack of money for technological re-equipment of the NEP was the unfavorable foreign trade turnover, which in the autumn of 1922 lags behind the overall pace of economic recovery. In the first half of 1922 the value of exports amounted to no more than 3% from the 1913 level, while the value of imports ten times the value of exports. This was due to the fact that the industry recovery had to be more to purchase abroad raw materials and equipment. Expand the import was only possible due to export growth, for example, the surplus of agricultural products. But purchasing the device Narkomvneshtorg was clumsy and inexperienced, and the money to purchase food from the peasants the state allocated very little. In addition, as I have already pointed out, agriculture in the years of the NEP a smooth transition from one to another famine.

Commissariat Sokolnikov tried to get permission for the temporary liberalization of import and export for farmers and enterprises (trusts) for certain categories of goods. V. I. Lenin spoke sharply against the weakening of the foreign trade monopoly, fearing the alleged smuggling of growth. In fact, the government feared that the manufacturers to get a free exit right on the world market, will feel their independence from the state and will again fight against the government. On this basis, the government did everything to prevent the de-monopolization of foreign trade.

So where do you can get the funds for industrialization?

There were two options. technology imports could be funded either at the expense of foreign lending, or by limiting the consumption of the population and the sale freed of export goods in foreign markets. Possibility of foreign credit has been significantly limited by the refusal of the Soviet Government to pay the king’s debts (though still less would be when trying to pay them money). In addition, usually foreign lending significantly narrowed the field of maneuver of investment – it can be seen even on the conditions imposed are now credited to countries by international financial institutions. Therefore, it was chosen the second way, but its implementation has been difficult up to the Great Depression.

Industrialization in the USSR by traditional methods, ie due to the accumulation of funds in the country and foreign loans, it was impossible. The population lacked the necessary accumulation and the loans could not be carried out nor on the economic (global economic crisis), not for political reasons.

One way would be non-economic pressure on farmers. However, the peasants, in full accordance with the law A. Chayanov [6] on the role of labor in the production of grain painful, did not want to strain for the country. They wanted to live for themselves.

The introduction of gold pieces and the ruble peg to gold sharply narrowed the investment opportunities of the Soviet government with the help of printing money, followed by inflation. A key element of the golden peg is almost complete elimination of emission of money not backed by gold. Gold then in the Soviet Union were caught less than under the tsars. Gold supply was also partially lost during the Civil War.

If productivity growth is not accompanied by the emission of the required number of credit money that should be in a golden anchor had to be backed by gold, the situation is decrease in prices. Available funds will rise in price, and the prices of goods and labor nepovyshayuschegosya quality will constantly decrease.

Suppose that in a country of 100 employees produce 100 pieces of a product and has outstanding 100 coins. If as a result of labor productivity growth in the output of goods increased by 2 times, and the rate of turnover of money and their number is not increased, then one coin can be purchased is not one piece of goods, but two. But one worker having to pay too, only one coin, and he began to work twice as effective and requires gain. If the worker continues to produce only one piece of the goods, then he has to pay half of the coin. The standard of living of the worker does not change, but psychologically he was suffering, because those increases productivity salary does not change ..

The system can only work if there is a steady decline in wages for labor of the same quality and price – otherwise all lazy and will not improve results. This, however, is not achieved without the full nationalization, because it is very difficult to reduce prices, if market participants are free to your choice. In a free market pricing to force all to reduce prices it is not only very difficult, and almost impossible.

Available data indicate that in the years of the NEP production growth was faster than the growth of the number of circulating money. As private banks were few and they were tightly controlled by the state, and the state bank could not withdraw himself from the golden peg and podpechatat money or allow an increase in the number of credit money, the money was not enough.

It means required to lower prices and, consequently, wages, but workers resisted this. Therefore, all went down to the peasants – the money from the peasantry siphoned via overcharges for industrial goods. As a result, industrial goods, if you count the cost in wheat poods, were several times higher than before the war. In addition, the low quality. It turned out the phenomenon that with a light hand Trotsky called the “price scissors”.

The consequence has been a redistribution of funds in favor of the industry due to the high prices of industrial goods and low, in comparison with them, for agricultural products, which immediately complicated the situation in the domestic market, expressed in grain procurement crisis of 1927/28 and 1928/29 years.

The amount of money in circulation is constantly growing.

Table 1 shows that in 1934 the government withdrew part of the money out of circulation. [7]

Farmers have responded simply: no longer sell grain, trading it thus for manufactured goods. The tax will pass, and the rest do not sell. Because there will always do that – better to feed the cattle, by eating better, cook moonshine, to be a bad year … stock farmer could easily abandon the consumption of industrial goods, if they obtain required additional efforts. The townspeople was impossible to refuse from bread consumption. Many peasants began to produce goods themselves and did not want to buy manufactured goods at a higher price. Circle.

At first it was thought that you can get loans in the West. However, in this period there was a rapid development of capitalism, especially in America. Therefore, funds for investments in the international financial market lacked credit and were very expensive. To obtain soft loans and restructure debt, it was necessary to prove that the Soviet Union is a reliable partner, recognized norms of international law. But it is hampered by the activities of the Comintern.

The refusal of the USSR from the payment of external debt obligations of the tsarist government, led to the fact that the Soviet Union could not negotiate on obtaining foreign loans. [8] If in 1913 foreign savings amounted to a quarter of the net investment, their share was zero, despite all the efforts of the USSR to obtain loans abroad, [9] since 1917.

In 1913, merchandise exports and imports of Russia for a total of 21% of the gross national product (GNP). By the end of the NEP, in 1928 they were equal to 6% of GDP, despite the significant liberalization of the Soviet regime. [10]

During the famine of 1921 West helped Russia because of failure to pay debts has not yet been announced. It is in full has been made only in 1922 at the Genoa Conference.

It would seem possible to start trading so than rich. When the noise of party discussions the farmer to the lack of industrial goods and in response to the hidden inflation responded more and more stubborn strike: do not take out on the grain market and did not increase the crops, and the right (Rykov, Tomsky, Bukharin), set at the time the tone, demanded to give more room capitalist tendencies in the village, raising the price of bread, at least by reducing the rate of the industry. The only way he could under such a policy would consist in the fact that, in exchange for raw materials exported abroad farm import finished products. But that would mean not to build the bond between peasant economy and industry of the USSR, and between the fist and the West. Naturally on the sovereignty of the USSR in this case it was necessary to forget.

Commissariat Sokolnikov strongly advocated the organization of joint trade companies with foreign capital participation, for the empowerment of the trusts and enabling them to enter the world market controlled by Commissariat. While 50% of foreign exchange earnings gave bread, 20% – Forest 20% – oil. But it turned out that to get money for their bread became difficult. In 1926, the export of bread fell to 0.6 million tons. The country was not able to recover their traditional world markets. The place was already taken. Cheap bread went from Argentina, Canada, Australia and South Africa. Poor market conditions in the global grain market, due to the sharp increase in the supply of grain from Argentina and Canada, makes it impractical extensions of exports of this commodity. [11] Besides the USSR during the NEP constantly lacked grain. It had even import (cm. Below).

The country’s trade balance deteriorated catastrophically. C 1928/29 1932/33 for execution on import plan decreased from 102.4 to 34.2% (based on actual results) [12]. Thus, international trade is not much she could help.

Faded and hopes for the concession. Their share in the total industrial output of the USSR in 1924 was only 0.2%, and by the end of the 1920s. – 0.6% [13].

We tried to get money for development through their brutal economy, the CEC and SNK Decree of 11 June 1926 on the saving mode identified as the main source mode of accumulation of savings, which presumes a sharp reduction in wasteful spending, freezing wages, reducing the growth of welfare expenditure budgets of different levels. But it soon became clear groundless hopes of saving mode as the primary source of repayment of the huge costs of industrialization. [14]

The most important source of domestic savings were to be government loans industrialization. The first loan of industrialization took place in 1927, the second – in 1928. Thus, the government tried to borrow money from the population, but the population was very poor.

One of the sources of currency for the purchase of technology has become the export of works of art. Starting with the 1927 People’s Commissariat assigns an annual plan to export antiques, although previously adopted decree banning the sale and export of works of art without the People’s Commissariat of sanctions [15]. 23 January 1928 the Council of People’s Commissars passed a resolution on measures to strengthen export and sale abroad of antiquities and art [16]. But it’s all been a pittance, but needed a lot of money.

Within the resources of the country could be taken only from the peasants and the church. But they did not want to give them. There was only one – share of accumulation, but rather the investment level, it was necessary to increase sharply, and lax, undisciplined manner of life is replaced by mobilization. in the journal “Bulletin of the Communist Academy” in 1924 Transfiguration offered to bet on accelerated industrialization due to the accumulation of funds received mainly from the peasantry. The farmer responded to the attempt of the state to increase taxes not as a civilized co-operators and, of course, money is not given. Of course, you can force the peasants to pay the Stolypin system, but because the power of some people! In addition, partelita and so was in fear of strengthening Nepmen, then the existing device would support only such measures of modernization, which at the same time “pushed” Nepmen and fists.

As I have already pointed out, attempts to exert pressure on the village with the help of taxes led to the grain procurement crisis. In addition, farmers quickly found a way to escape the tax burden – large prosperous farms fragmented into small, to hide income and reduce taxes. The number of kulak farms decreased by 25%. The lack of clear criteria for the allocation of the kulaks opened up to local authorities wide scope for arbitrariness.

Looking for a way that would allow the state in the most simple way to reallocate funds between sectors of the economy, continued throughout the period of the NEP coagulation [17]. The solution was found in the 5-year plan and the printing of money. Yes, the industrialization of the country was carried out at the expense of monetary financing after the actual abandonment of the gold peg.

However, the attempt to print money has exacerbated the crisis of grain procurement and has led to a huge inflation. If the issue was addressive in 1928, then in 1929 – 800 million rubles, in 1930 and 1931 – 1.5 billion, and in 1932 – already 2.7 billion rubles. In 1932, free market prices exceeded 8 times the level in 1928 [18].

One of the key conditions for success of industrialization would attract large numbers of people in the industry. But the peasants did not want to leave my mother-land, therefore it was necessary to create such conditions in rural areas, so that the masses of people were forced to leave it and take employment elsewhere. Dates also had to be reduced as much as possible – painful for the society and the country should carry out the operation as quickly as possible.

It was necessary to solve something. Stalin, being a pragmatist, did not lay eggs in one basket. He began acting in all directions. Firstly, the Comintern’s activity has been substantially limited. Secondly, it produced the second account, confiscation of church valuables. Third, consent was given on the sale of paintings by the great old masters from the Hermitage … [19]. Finally, there have been attempts to solve the problems of the state budget by increasing the production of vodka – in 1930, production of vodka was increased [20].

Now supporters of the then opposition are trying to present the case so that if the opposition has consistently fought against the people of soldering. They cite evidence that Trotsky at the April plenum of 1926 among the amendments to the draft Rykov resolution on the economic situation in the USSR as a separate item highlighted the need to review the question of vodka “on the basis of existing experience, which shows that the state sale of vodka, playing a very minor role in the inflow of the village to heavy industry (this was the objective), cuts right at the same time a serious magnitude in wages working “[21]. All this is true. But eating that money is needed immediately, not in 10 years, when ogranocheniya release of vodka could prove himself, and is not known to have shown or not.

Most interesting is that Stalin had promised to abandon this “temporary means of unusual properties,” “as soon as there are in our national economy, new sources of new revenue for the further development of our industry”. [22] In reality, as always I had to choose between bad and very bad decision.

And industrialization was creaked: nothing is done in time, the most valuable equipment gubilos. It turned out that no one knows how to do, is not able to establish a new production and handling equipment, work in modern industry. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the equipment was used and received a very, very bad. The reason was that the staff was very low qualifications. There was a huge number of marriage and substandard work. The equipment is often just comes into disrepair even before installing it. This is most clearly revealed in the early years of the first Five-Year Plan, when debt and the trade deficit grew dramatically. But especially apparent incompetence of the staff party apparatus, which were good professional revolutionaries, but did not have the slightest special knowledge and skills, and the lazy calm of the NEP years.

Finally, seeing the hopeless situation, Stalin decided to amputate a gangrenous limb rural market directly without anesthesia – he decided on the hard in relation to the population variant simultaneous collectivization and industrialization, in which the role of the entrepreneur, organizer, supervisor had to play state, ie, first party apparatus. Withdrawal of grain from the peasants would give the opportunity to exchange it for the technology abroad. In fact, because of the sharp trade deficit Stalin was forced to go down the same path as that of tsarist Russia – to increase grain exports – again, “not finishing, and take out.”

In fact, Stalin gave the acquisition of invaluable experience and equipment in the West down to the last gram of gold reserves, export a kilogram of grain, pieces of exported eggs. The very brutality of the decision explicitly states – Stalin was aware of the war as inevitable and unavoidable reality.


Collectivization was objectively necessary and no other way for the country was not and here’s why. In the early 20-ies. in our village dominated plow yes torch, while the US, UK, other European countries is almost complete electrification of agriculture. From this backward, medieval village had to draw strength and resources for the industrialization of the country, the formation of a modern army, restoring the war-ravaged economy – another way it was not simple. This ocean of backward private households should have translated into a socialist collectivization with all its inevitable costs and “outs”. And all this under the pressure of a hostile capitalist encirclement, an accelerated pace in the historically shortest possible time – the other did not exist.

According to the former Minister of Agriculture A. Venediktov [23], if the collectivization and industrialization of the late five years or six – failed economy would provide everything necessary for the victory over fascism and the village – to feed the army and the population, not to mention the occurs in the rear of the “fifth column” of the hated Soviet rule small proprietors kulaks. The fact of the matter is that the “normal” possible history did not give us, and had to act, “abnormal”, that is, an accelerated, pace.

Stalin realized that the market for agricultural problems to solve Russia does not wash, because the market does not fit the problem disutility of labor, identified Chayanov. Although the cause of collectivization were objective factors, the specificity of the historical development of the country, but the reason was a chronic grain crisis in the years of the NEP. Stalin had long waited for the results of the NEP not wait – drought and crop failure in 1928 in the Ukraine and a chronic lack of food forced Soviet collectivization pravitrelstvoi start.

The debate about the existence of alternatives to collectivization continues today and not fade away, probably for a long time. It appears that any of the suggested hypothetical alternatives should be considered not only in terms of pure economic indicators but also in terms of political feasibility, not to mention the ability to think of leadership of a decision in those circumstances, and with the level of economic knowledge. For example, it is absurd to abuse Stolypin that he was not selected from the landlords at once all the land without compensation – who would let him? [24] In addition, the proposed alternative is to include a correction for the human factor, the inevitable distortion lasting by governmental decisions. It is obvious that small farms had to displace the large and increasing fiscal pressure, but pre-guess the best way to implement this program, it was not easy. If it is said that it was necessary to carry out collectivization softer, you will need to answer the question, what specific action the government had to be different, and on the basis of what information the government had previously guessed.

Modern Canadian economist R.K.Allen [25] has made a mathematical model of the economy of the USSR 20-30-ies of the XX century, from which the following conclusion:

“While there is some truth in some of the arguments in support of the importance of collectivization, the most important point remains that its cumulative impact was small. It slows the growth during the first five-year plan and accelerated it later, but its cumulative effect over the 30 years has been only a small support economic expansion. Human suffering that accompanied collectivization, were huge, while the economic results have been meager. “

However, Allen’s model of macroeconomic, not microeconomic, and certainly not a model of agricultural technology. The initial data it extrapolated some of the trends of the late 20’s to 30’s, but did not explain why they should have stayed that way. For example, Allen suggests that the migratory behavior of the rural population in the city would remain the same, but this assumption remains unlikely, provided that the fiscal pressure on the peasants would not have increased. The fact that the city’s food supply would inevitably deteriorate, that would worsen the life in the cities and slowed migration. Not to mention the fact that the migration of the 20’s only restored the urban population of tsarist Russia and filling in the hands of a pre-existing industry. New jobs – yesterday’s peasants, very slow to acquire industrial skills.

In its alternative model of Allen suggests a significant public investment, that is (as far as can be judged), involves significant fiscal pressure on farmers, but we have seen that the state was unable to increase the pressure on the peasantry without forced collectivization. It seems, at this major obstacle rested all alternative projects and in 1928. No mathematical model does not show the impasse to which came the Soviet government in an attempt to force the peasants to give the city more bread, because neither the behavior of the peasants nor the behavior of officials, nor the level of economic knowledge elite did not fit into the mathematical model. Hindsight is easy to see where the leadership had to be more careful, but whether it can be seen, then?

Meanwhile, at the borders of the Soviet Union escalated tensions. In July 1929, China grasps the CER. I had to bring troops into the territory of Manchuria, which forced the Chinese to accept the state of affairs prior to the conflict. Possible future war with China or Japan, was the last straw that forced Stalin to take measures to create an economic system that guarantees the supply of the city and the military industries and armies grain.

Can I increase PROIZVODTVO corn by economic incentives?

Common leitmotif of all kolletivizaii objective analysis was an indication that the authorities, they say, made a mistake not to create conditions for the material interest of the peasants. Why it is considered that for the growth of grain production had just material interest of the peasants. But this is not the case for Russia.

Prominent Russian economist A. Chayanov [26] has shown that this provision is not true. Material incentives work only when the painful labor is not great, as it happened, when the village came mechanization. Farmers are very adequately respond to the increase in tractive load on yourself if this load was too much for them, they cut production to a minimum necessary to feed themselves and cattle. After work Chayanov became very clear that the manual agricultural labor, pay increases for grain immediately would reduce grain production, as happened after the revolution, when the production of marketable grain has fallen sharply.

Russian peasant produces products. Mainly for themselves. As much as it sees fit, and how much it is allowed to strength and cash conditions. It produces for other only if gets for these products are adequate reparation. If the compensation is inadequate – it does not produce anything on the side. So there has always been so in history. If the king would take an exorbitant tribute from a unit of land – the farmer reduced the crop. If you take an exorbitant tribute to the soul – was served on the run or robbers. If the Bolsheviks during the surplus taken “all too much” – he has not cultivated anything beyond the minimum required. If the Bolsheviks during the collectivization prefer to pay for the bread blank pieces of paper, but less – the same tactic.

In the years of the NEP non-economic effects on farmers to increase grain production sharply weakened. Despite all the attempts of the Soviet authorities to force peasants to work in the country, they worked on the basis of the law Chayanov. This is – the nature of the peasant economy. In another way, farmers do not behave. Sovereign greatness, industrialization, the public interest and other urban fun they deeply care. The peasants produced for themselves as much as considered necessary and is not considered the interests of the state.

Taxes burdened the Soviet power, but not too (at least until 1927). No wonder their descendants still remember the period of the NEP as the best in Soviet history. After the liquidation of the land of the landlords enough. Take the grain could not pass, and pretend that neurodilos. As one of the participants SG Kara-Murza [27], “and that in the cities were starving and growing unemployment – because” we do not circumvent tse not bypassed “and the prospect of the return of the landowners in the distant future …” “How..” Therefore, the peasantry, especially the middle and wealthy, resisted collectivization and just limiting their right to disagree.

The peasants in the Soviet Union did not want to strain very hard times, and years. Even the Great Patriotic War did not make all the farmers pull their socks up: only 5 months of 1942 those farmers who have not practiced a minimum of workdays, put on trial. They turned out to be 151 thousand, of which 117 000 were convicted. The convicts were obliged to work in his own farm, but with them 6 months withhold 25% of workdays for the benefit of the kolkhoz [28]. Yes, and farmers do not really want to strain after the war. I had to take action. During the summer of 1948 only from the RSFSR were sent to remote areas of 12 thousand farmers for evading work. And they were sent by the decision of the kolkhoz meeting [29].

Most importantly, of course, is that the mechanization of agriculture leads to increased productivity and frees up manpower. However, mechanization of labor concerns not only the cultivation process and the harvest, where we get not only the release of labor, but also improves the quality of treatment (due to the increase of capacity), increased mobility (limited number of powerful tractors, we can plow more land throwing them one section to another), the mechanization of the harvest. Mechanization concerns transporting and handling and storage of agricultural products obtained, for a total “tractor myth” forget about it.

How much do their own peasant could thresh and winnow grain harvested using a flail and a shovel as essential tools? A processor allows you to have on the field of threshed grain, in contrast to the header. Further. Mechanization displace draft animals – and allows the area under fodder to do Food and productive.

At the same time agriculture is growing at the expense of application of chemicals (fertilizers, herbicides and inesektitsidy), at the expense of science (removal and introduction of high-yield plant varieties and animal breeds, improved compliance crop lands, proper tracking of sowing time and harvest, care for the growing season – the same chemical weeding ). Derivation of highly productive varieties of plants (or animals breed) requires certain resources (people, acreage, the same fertilizer) and the cost of the process (plus a time). All of this should be available, otherwise the result will not be, and whether it was in the farm collectivization to such opportunities, no, before the revolution, this was done only to large landowners. On the other hand increase the productivity of plants and animals can further release resources. To do all this requires serious public investment.

Further. Not everywhere in the Russian Empire all lands that could be used for the production of grain were sown. For example, in the Volga region of fertile land were in many places are not cultivated, in most cases due to the lack of mechanization (which would plow the remote site two horses were required, one get to the field, the second plow on arrival, then change horses, and “all your carried with me” you take and feed and food and water, in the desert there is no water, the wells must be several tens of meters, that would get to the drinking water, and if the plow should be a few days?), another thing is the tractor, horse forces that more can and one day exercise avitsya. And we must not forget that the increase in acreage allows navigate to 7 years of productive turnover of land when the land “is resting and gaining strength.”

Add to this is also an opportunity to make fertilizer, by the way as soon as the mechanization of the countryside ended in the early 90’s, these are designed in Soviet times, fate once again turned out to be abandoned, some already steppe weeds taller than a man, and it is found in grasshoppers.

In this respect, there was no alternative to collectivization, and subject to the conditions, and it could not be a more gently than it managed to do. Collectivization perfectly coped with this task, and it allowed to increase the cultivated area and increase the commodity agricultural production.

And the current situation in Russia proves the correctness of Stalin. For example, being in Tula last year, I heard from the locals such stories that the fields abandoned 15 years ago has grown birch from 15 to 30 cm in diameter at the roots. As they were joking, “Will you come into the woods near Tula, Kursk come out!”. In other words, as soon as we have limited possibilities of mechanization of labor in rural areas, the situation has descended into total collapse. The time to carry out collectivization and industrialization again.

Salvation through collectivization

Today’s Democrats accuse Stalin that he broke his collectivization of the normal course of economic recovery. But it was the case in reality? To understand why Stalin took this unusual step, examine how crystallized solution of collectivization.

In the December 1927 decision of the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) has been planned collectivization, would provide increased productivity, creates a reliable food bank, freeing up manpower for the industry. But what was meant? course in a phased was approved, 10-15 years collectivization of agriculture. Collectivization planned discontinuous, non-violent, to new untapped lands planned to create a powerful grain farms.

The basic idea of collectivization was to increase the acreage [30]. In the North Caucasus area of crops in the 1931-1932 years 12.7 million hectares of crop area has already exceeded in 1913, 11.4 million hectares [31].

As you can see, no one in no hurry to collectivization. But then, in 1928, Ukraine is affected severe hunger. The famine in Ukraine in 1928-1929, he was the third of hunger, which had to fight the Soviet government because of agriculture’s exposure to natural conditions. Chairman of People’s Commissars Rykov in 1928 in September, said that they are at least 4 years of struggling with the drought in the Ukraine [32].

grain procurement plan in 1928, only managed to perform cost house searches in villages and trials. For concealment of bread, for example, in the Middle Volga was put on trial 17 thousand. Farms strong. In the fall of 1929 about one-third of bread seized by force. [33]

It was the grain crisis in 1928 forced the Politburo to speed up the search for ways to solve the grain problem by reforming agriculture is said to have got problems. Initially, it was decided to build dozens of grain state farms in the areas of pristine land to the east of the Volga. It needed a solution not only to the grain problem. Labor shortages in the industry dictated forced to solve this problem. That is why it was decided to speed up the collectivization [34].

Hunger in 1928 and the need for constant food imports forced the leaders of the Soviet Union to act more decisively. Hunger in 1928 was the main cause of the crisis of the grain and the decision on the forcing of collectivization. In 1928 it adopted a new Code of agricultural restricting land rent and rent for forbidding fists. In May 1928, immediately after the failure of the seed, was held in Moscow conference on the output of the grain crisis. It was decided to create a cereal farms in the eastern regions of the USSR. Hrushevsky, head of the Ukrainian State Farm Association, said at the conference that it is enough the slightest drought in the Ukraine, the situation is dramatically complicated, and there is in the grain crisis. [35] In 1929, two years in a row of repeating cold snowless winters in Ukraine ended, “nearly total loss of winter crops.” In June 1929 it was decided to start preparing for the forced collectivization. In particular, provision had been made about the organization of the machine and tractor stations.

It must be said that even the “fast collectivization” could be interpreted in different ways and to hold. Firstly, the “fast” can mean “complete collectivization” a year or two, and the unification of the majority of farms in five years.

The country’s leadership does not aim to achieve collectivization one and all for a couple of years. It has put forward a different program: to organize collective farms in the villages on a voluntary basis, to help them at the state level, to show the rest of the peasants the advantages of living in collective and win there, in the end all. But try to imagine, how real was this program. Firstly, the farm would have reached first the poorest peasants, so that a new economy would have been poorer livestock and inventory than neighbors, but the poorest farmers still had to accustom to farm. Secondly, the very idea of the organization of the collective farm, and include a simplified mechanism for increasing the withdrawal of food for the benefit of the city – or lose all the effect to accelerate industrialization. In other words, the life of the peasants in the new collective obviously could not be better than not recycled in neighboring farm – both because of the initial line, and in connection with an increase in tax exemptions. The only way to make the life of farmers better than their neighbors, was to strengthen the tax burden on the remaining individual farmers even more than in the collective farms. But the state could no longer do so – with individual farmers to collect rent as with the king, the Bolsheviks did not know how, but the mechanism of “price scissors” was ineffective.

In fact, united under the name TOZ, cooperatives, communes and state farms already existed in the Soviet Union for a long time. Moreover, except for the state and municipalities, these associations were not communist invention and have been known the revolution. They emerged as a voluntary peasant associations. The main incentive of these organizations became immunity to competition, the ability to receive government loans and substantial assistance in providing agricultural inventory and seeds. In Ukraine, there are two types of agricultural cooperatives (associations): TOZ – Treatment Earth Partnership and the gang. Only labor and land, or part of it, as well as heavy agricultural machinery were collective. Livestock, housing, and even part of the land is in the personal property of the peasants. It was loosely organized association of which any of its members could freely go out.

Artel was a group of people engaged in a craft and united in a cooperative for the production of concrete products. Agricultural cooperative consisted of farmers who have decided to pool their land, equipment, horses and jointly engage in the cultivation of the crop. Their work is paid according to the attached to the cause of labor. Each member of the cooperative has the right to keep its own house, cow, sheep, goats, pigs and poultry. During a full collectivization in the Soviet Union cooperative it became the prototype of what is now known as the collective farm.

Farming communities began to emerge during the period of War Communism (during the Civil War, 1918-1921.). they are usually organized in the former manor house. Farming communities (communes) were basically not only a collective farming, but also the socialization of all aspects of life, including shared homes, canteens, kindergartens and nurseries, etc. The members of these communities have been deprived of the right to private property, except for the most necessary personal items. Commune received great support from the Communist Party and the government, but, nevertheless, they were doomed to failure. They are either dissolved, or that there has been, in most cases, were transformed into state farms – farms.

State Farm is a public company with the involvement of hired workers receiving regular paychecks. Farm workers employed in such an undertaking were not peasants in the full sense of the word. They were denied the right to vote on the distribution of income from the sale of produced goods and participation in governance.

All these collective farms were organized on a voluntary basis, excludes any pressure. But when top management has put forward an unrealistic program of gradual luring peasants in the “carrot” collective farms, local party apparatus immediately realized its utopianism and carried out in his own way – by the forced collectivization of all with the completion of collective property at the expense of the dispossessed. At the same time, for some strange reason, the basis was taken way to organize kibbutzim developed Socialist-Zionists of Jewish colonists in Palestine. The project is based on the collectivization of the kibbutz has been developed for the colonists-residents and is quite consistent with their cultural stereotypes, as they are not going to create a peasant household or start livestock. The socialization of property in the kibbutzim has been brought to the highest degree, no property was not allowed even to dine at home to members of the cooperative were forbidden. Kibbutzim, the creation of which has increased after the First World War, proved to be a very efficient way of manufacturing (and remains so, for example, in Israel, up to the present time). Apparently, the leadership and the People’s Commissariat of the Agrarian Institute was greatly impressed by the economic indicators of this type of cooperatives, without any doubt, use ready-made organizational chart. The question of its cultural characteristics under the Russian village and did not get up. Nobody expected that farmers will eat cattle. Although peasants 20s warned those same commissioners, advocates of collectivization, that “stranger skotinka” left untidy.

Exploring the Political Bureau of the special folder, M. Tauger [36] found that the collectivization idea arose from the program, adopted in 1928 – the creation of several dyaesyatkov large state farms in the virgin lands in the eastern and south-eastern regions, then using natural nutrients stocks get guaranteed yields for 5-10 years.

So, what happened? Contrary to the plans of senior management, local party apparatus carried out a complete collectivization already in 1929. Perhaps it was the only way to “move a cart.” It inevitably led to excesses. There are many indications that the farmers themselves collected grain from dekulakize. (And then they themselves, these farmers and cattle techniques coffin and orchards were cut down because they are usually led neumohi, agitators or the local loafers). Why dispossession affected not only fists, but also a large part of the middle peasants? The reason is that the collective farm voluntarily middle peasants did not want to go. If there was no violence, each middle peasants would sit quietly, knowing that it is not touched. The practice of dispossession led to the fact that such a middle peasant immediately copied into fists or prokulak, and he knew it. That is, the peasants knew that no one would be saved if you do not obey.

At the beginning of 1929 there were rumors that the Communist Party and the Soviet government decided to hold the collectivization of farms. Most likely it is the People’s Commissariat made instigator accelerated collectivization.

Therefore, mass collectivization (even contradicts Supreme Economic Plan) began in June 1929 – of course, it was carried out with the widespread use of coercive measures. In autumn it is supplemented by violent grain procurements. As a result of these measures in the collective association does become widespread, and that gave rise to Stalin in November of the same in 1929 to make a statement that the middle peasants went into collective farms. Stalin’s article was called – “Great Break”. Immediately after this article the next plenum of the Central Committee approved the new, increased and accelerated collectivization and industrialization plans. [37] Plenum of the Central Committee has decided not only to accelerate the pace of collectivization, but also the establishment of the People’s Commissariat, the head of which in December 1929 was appointed Ya Yakovlev. Besides the plenum decided to send a collective 25,000 workers for collectivization.

December 27, 1929, Stalin announced the beginning of complete collectivization and liquidation of the kulaks as a class. Then People’s Commissars adopted a resolution with a set of signs “kulak farming” for the dispossession (in fact, one of these symptoms could be attributed every prosperous peasant households drawn into the trade turnover). Trying to follow this decision led to the resistance of the peasants.

Many local party organs began cannibalization on their own initiative osche to Stalin’s speech in December 1929 [38]. According to SG Kara-Murza [39], “in many places cannibalization were just fists, occupy an important position in the local government collectivization means the creation of the rural environment of the revolutionary chaos in these moments there is a” molecular “civil war -.. The reduction of all sorts of personal and political scores. this situation most effectively uses the strongest and most organized part. ” He writes further: “For example, was” expropriated “My grandfather, a former Cossack-pauper, all seven sons and daughters who were communists older ones were in 1918, the organizers of the underground party and Komsomol in the village. Thus,. time of collectivization became a little relapse, flash smoldering embers in the village of civil war. “

S.G.Kara-Murza said. “At first, the formation of collective farms was successful, farmers perceive the farm as a cooperative, well-known form of industrial cooperation, does not destroy the farmhouse – the basic unit of the entire structure of the Russian village … collectivization was seen as the revival and strengthening of the community soon, however, it turned out that the socialization comes true. far (in the farm worker climb and dairy cattle, inventory) that the basic structure peasant household collapses. There was resistance administrative pressure, and then and repression. “

It seems that the leaders of the USSR did not understand the role of a poor harvest in 1928 and seen around the enemies. In order to somehow justify their intuitive decisions (Marxist theory was powerless), Stalin advanced the thesis of the intensification klasovoy struggle as we move towards socialism. At the plenum VKPb right Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov sharply criticized the economic policies of Stalin.

But he Rykov himself conducted the realization of economic decisions taken by the Politburo.

At the beginning of 1930 continued in the field forced collectivization. About the heat, cover the entire country, according to official data, according to which the beginning of January 1930 in the collective farms there were more than 20% by the beginning of March – more than 50% of farms.

So reckless statements of the leaders led to the flywheel dispossession and forced collectivization.

If we think of analogies, it can be argued that in 1929, Stalin and his supporters held a radical surgery to remove the market of the Western type of tumor, the body grows in Russia, of the Soviet society bodies. The operation had to make an urgent, time to prepare the operation is almost was not, and ideological anesthetics, such as Marxism, no longer worked.

In the latest features

But everything turned out not nearly as much as intended. The operation gave complications. The patient from whom gangrenosum amputated limb without anesthesia (time, and there was no means for anesthesia) began strongly twitch – began collectivization led to a sharp increase in resistance by farmers.

In January-March 1930 it was held not less than 2200 armed actions with the participation of nearly 800 thousand peasants. [40] Only the mass demonstrations in which 125,000 people participated, 346 were registered in January 1930, and in February, has 736 performances and more than 220 thousand participants. During the first half of March – 595 major speeches and 230,000 members, excluding Ukraine, and even 500 appearances in the Ukraine. The process was clearly on the rise.

According to estimates Ivnitskii (link), in March 1930 in Belarus, the Central Black Earth region, the Lower and Middle Volga, North Caucasus, Siberia, the Urals, the Moscow, Leningrad, Western, Ivanovo-Voznesensk regions, Crimea and Central Asia 1642 mass demonstrations in which 750-800 thousand people took part was recorded. In total, according to the GPU for January – April 1930 was 6117 of performances, numbering 1,755,300 members. [41]

Besides uprisings flourished terror. Thus, in March 1930 only a year and only 521 the attack was registered in Ukraine (and how many are not registered!), In the Central Black Earth region – 192, including 25 murders. In Western Siberia, during 9 months of 1930 – more than 1,000 terrorist attacks, 624 of them – murder and assassination. In the Urals, in January – March were 260 cases, and even in the peaceful district of the Novgorod, Leningrad region – 50 cases. And this is just the tip of the iceberg recorded [42, 43].

Mukhin writes that the events of 1930, it is pulled into the civil war, peasant resistance was much stronger than in 1921, when not counting bandsobyty, there were two major uprisings: West Siberian rebellion – about 60 thousand people – and the famous Antonov in Tambov – all -What about 50 thousand. The rest of the rebel leaders – Vakulin, Serov, boots, horns – numbered in their “armies” of not more than two thousand people, and it is not constant. They will take captive the whole regiment – they have two thousand “soldiers.” A week later, they flee – they all again the same three hundred cavalry. [44]

In 1930, we see a very different picture. … Large antikolhoznye by peasants took place in Ukraine, in the Volga region, Kazakhstan, Siberia, the North Caucasus, in Central Asia. Meanwhile, many local leaders shamelessly lied “up”. “… The work in the region takes place without any complications at high-rise farm-hand the poorer masses,” – said Stalin, First Secretary of the CPSU (b) B.P.Sheboldaev of the Lower Volga regions [45].

So, in 1930 the Soviet Union was in a state close to the period of the Civil War. The country has been on a starvation diet, the budget deficit Lata emissions, forced subscription for loans … While 1930 was a record grain harvest, but export abroad, and workers often went hungry. This is evidenced by an appeal to the workers of Izhevsk plant Rykov. “Save us from hunger …” [46]. In 1931 there was the largest foreign trade deficit of 300 million. Rubles in gold, and debts have to give.

There is another important aspect. As a result of the collectivization of the repressive activities of secret services sharply intensified – the number of prisoners in the camps increased from 180 thousand in 1930 to 510 thousand in 1934. This objective led to the strengthening of the role of repressive bodies. Remember this idea – it will help us to better understand the mechanisms of the unwinding of the flywheel of repression.

Temporary derogations

Although it has taken a number of important decisions to rectify the matter, but the inertia of the running machine was very high, and the conflict created in the village flared in March-April 1930, the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Begun in the winter “cannibalization” was continued.

Frightened by reports from the field of mass abuses and growing resistance of peasants, March 2, 1930, Stalin published in “Pravda” article “Dizzy with success” with “kinks” criticism. In the article the main responsibility for mistakes made in the course of collectivization was assigned to the local party workers accused of “bungling”. So the way it was. Nobody demanded from them the socialization of land and annoying peasants violence. The article also pointed out the need for caution in the collectivization and its entirely voluntary.

Pressure on farmers has been weakened, began outflow of the farms. Degree collectivization which by that time has reached 57% of all households, dropped to 38% in April [47]. In May 1930, the collective farms remained 23.6% of all farms, including in Lower Volyn region – 37.5%, in the North Caucasus – 58.1%, Ukraine – 38.29% [48] . In June 25% of farmers left before a collective [49]. She then until January 1931 stabilized at the level of 22-24%, and then began to grow up to 93% by the summer of 1937 “. [50]

It was in response to the March article Stalin, apparently, and started butchering. Therefore, November 1, 1930 issued a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the CPC and prohibiting slaughter cattle up to 31 December 1930. In the spring of 1932, local authorities were forbidden to socialize and even cattle were ordered to help the collective farmers to cattle Furnished.

According to Yu.I.Muhina [51], the publication of the March article Stalin became a tragic mistake. Article has given license to a mass exit of peasants from collective farms with their cattle. And when the second, more “soft” wave of collectivization 1930-1931-1932’s farmers already in advance killed and ate their cattle before entering – do not lose as its good!

When in the spring and summer of 1930 after Stalin’s article peasants began to emerge from the collective and, thinking that now they will have to work only on themselves, to successfully grow a good crop. At the same time it went unspoken competition between those who came from the farm, and those who remained. In addition, and especially within the South of Ukraine have played a role successes Lysenko vernalization method (see. Below).

At the XVI Congress of the Communist Bolshevik Party in 1930 relative overpopulation of the village has been taken into account as a source of manpower for the industry. In 1931, again launched a campaign to collectivization. Dispossession and continued with renewed vigor. Peasants again began to forcibly herded into collective farms and individual farmers have imposed exorbitant taxes. Those who re-entered the collective farms, just wanted to “eat” all your personal belongings. So under the knife hit the oxen. So did those individual farmers who went into the city. Total for 1930-1931 years was expropriated 569 thousand. Families, of which 381 thousand. Was evicted in remote areas.

As always, there were plenty of idiocy in the field. For example, individual farmers against CC VKPb Ukraine prescribed natural fines apply a setting additional assignments myasozagotovkam of 15-month-old standards [52]. Is it any wonder that the cows and oxen were cut?

After in 1931 the farm again entered previously released, they began to spoil the “herd” farmers, preaching the idea that you can not work. Blossomed indiscriminate theft. In some places, a secret sabotage led to a sharp deterioration in the quality of the field work. In addition, lack of oxen, led to a bad plowing. Divorced a lot of weeds, which led to a very poor crop straw.

Only in the spring 1932 local authorities were forbidden to socialize and even cattle were ordered to help the collective farmers to cattle Furnished. Since 1932 not already held by broad and dispossessed campaigns. By the fall of 1932 in the collective consisted of 62.4% of farms, and it was announced that the complete collectivization in the main completed.

However, 1932 was the year of another acute social crisis. In many parts of the country, especially in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus, there was little civil war, maintaining that required sending troops, including artillery and tanks against the peasantry. In many areas, I will point out one special – a city of Ivanovo and Ivanovo region (large textile and industrial center), – there was a wave of strikes due to intolerable conditions faced by workers [53].

Not all went smoothly and in industry. Due to lack of funds in January 1931 five-year plan has been reduced and reduced to 65 shock construction project has already passed zero cycle [54]. Also already in 1932 he revealed the unreality of “Great Leap Forward” in the industry as a whole, when it turned out that the production of electricity amounted to only 13.5 billion kW / h (compared to 22 billion in the first five-year plan.), Coal mining -. 64, 4 million tons (75 million tons against.), pig iron -. 6.2 million tons (10 million tons against.).. More less reassuring results were 1933 year in which the industrial production increase was only 5.5% (versus 16.5% of the annual plan and 25.2% of the optimal embodiment of the first Five).

Given the failure of the first five-year plan targets, Stalin at the January plenum of the Central Committee in 1933 proclaimed the rejection of the policy of “the most accelerated pace,” saying that there is no need “podhlostyvat and customized country.” Accordingly, he proposed a five-year plan for the second 13-14% annual growth of industrial production “at least”. [55]


At this time the event occurred, which, apparently, was the last straw, to reverse the situation in favor of the USSR. In 1929, the first in the US, and then the Great Depression began in Europe. Credit money began to go out of trust, especially in Western countries. Appeared free money for investment and therefore any trading partner became its weight in gold. Let me remind you that the Soviet Union did not give loans because of its failure in 1922 to pay the debts of tsarist Russia. By 1932, the Soviet Union has shown itself a reliable partner, so it became profitable to trade with the Soviet Union.

But now, finally, there are the first results of the industrialization. National income has grown over the years 1929-1933 by 59%. In 1933-1934, the Soviet Union finally normalizes finances and gives almost all the debt – by the end of 1933 the Soviet Union was able to pay two-thirds of the foreign debt incurred for the implementation of the first five-year plan – about 1 billion gold rubles. By 1933, the foreign trade balance was active and brought the country income of 150 mln. Rubles in gold. [56]

But the country has saved not only the public pressure and a foreign loan, but also the enthusiasm of thousands of people carried out the collectivization and participating in industrialization, simple peasants, workers, and scientific and technical intelligentsia, who understood the significance of the event and went to the victim. In case, if the rejection of collectivization and industrialization were total – the state would have collapsed and a new civil war. The Soviet regime in the years suffered their first real “test of legitimacy.” And he withstood.


Despite the costs, collectivization allowed to organize the removal of a vast proportion of the village of the product and move it into the city, which for this product came to the rural population. Stalin took the path of a violent and rapid collectivization while indirect investment in the village.

After the change of the organizational scheme of the collective farm on a kibbutz artel that allowed private ownership of livestock, the process has begun successfully. In addition, the state has found, finally, the way of economic strangulation of inefficient small farms, and the liberation of their land for farms. If a farmer on property level could not to be ascribed to the kulaks, and the farm did not want to go, it obkladyvali individual tax [57], many times greater than the possibility of the economy, and then imprisoned for non-payment.

During the collectivization of the village made great strides forward to the modern organization of production and labor, civilized culture and life. But expect some miraculous results, elimination of the backlog from the West over the shortest possible time is simply unrealistic. Only in the early 50-ies. the state for the first time have the opportunity to direct the development of agriculture major forces and means. Prior to that, the city is largely lived off the village, and there was no alternative, except only in the cabinet illusions “eminent historians” [58].

Yes, the village paid a heavy tribute for its industrialization, and industrialization but quickly began to pay to borrow. Despite all the difficulties, industrialization led to a sharp rise in armed Technical Agriculture. Already before the war, there have been significant developments in the field of agricultural mechanization, mainly its grain industry.

We came into effect large tractor works (but it was also the tank factories). By 1930, at the collective farm fields left about 200 thousand tractors (they will have 500 thousand in 1932-1937.) [59]. During the years 1933-1937 produced more than 500 thousand. Tractors (in 15-strong on-year), 123.5 thousand. Harvesting, over 142 thousand. Trucks for the countryside. By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan in agriculture employed 345 thousand. Tractors and 129 thousand. Harvesters, made mostly by domestic manufacturers [60]. Tractors and combines it possible to increase the grain wedge.

In order to ensure proper maintenance of agricultural machinery, were established machine and tractor stations (MTS) – state-owned enterprises, to focus agricultural equipment and enter into contracts with collective farms for the production of certain works. MTS network has expanded rapidly and in 1937 served already 90% of the farms. The transition to large-scale and to a large extent already occurred mechanized agriculture production and productivity began to grow rapidly. After collectivization was discontinued grain imports and imports of cotton, which was spent about the same amount in the first five-year period, as in metals procurement.

The Soviet peasantry to “digest” the alien model farms and adapt to local cultural types (adapting itself). [61] So, the issue was resolved uneven burden on farmers during the field work. In 1925, the workload of the peasants was 92 days a year. In 1932, the 148 workdays. In 1940, 254 workdays [62]. New cooperative charter guaranteed the existence of the personal monastery of the collective farmer.

However, many defects were communal system. As it turned out, after the completion of collectivization in the countryside remained the same difficulties that were in the old communities – patchwork, remote field, alternating fields together different teams, etc. Therefore, at the end of 1935 the government was forced to take a major land reform. [63].

In connection with the successes achieved since 1 January 1935 has been canceled card system for bread and bakery products. Individual peasants more and more convinced of the benefits of the collective farm system and join collective farms. In 1937, in the collective sector was already 93% of farms and 99.1% of the cultivated area [64].

The average grain yield in the prewar years was equal to 7.4 tons per 1 hectare, while for 1933-1937. – 9.1 centners. In 1913, total gross grain harvest was equal to 801 million quintals, and in 1937 he 1202.9 million cwt. Since 1955 the granary grain yields in the USSR has consistently exceeded a record fees: 1913 (. 92 million tons of the empire without Finland); 1937 (97 million tons of “bunker” weight;.. On the territory of the USSR in 1926-1938 gg boundaries); 1940 (96 million tons of “bunker” weight;. On the territory of the USSR, within the limits of 1946-1990 gg.) [65].

In the years 1938-1941 without exception, foreign authors [66] noted a sharp rise in the standard of living of the peasants. Improving the lives of farmers in comparison with the times of the NEP was not only to improve nutrition, but also to increase the consumption of manufactured goods, but especially – in the improvement of the social sphere. From 1927 to 1937 the number of beds increased in rural hospitals in the 3-fold, while the number of rural doctors – 2.5 times [67].

Therefore, it should be noted that the pop-up from time to time the idea of the “robbery of the peasantry” for industrialization have malicious slander, because priority construction projects in the course of industrialization were the Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor factories and GAZ, ie enterprise, designed primarily to facilitate heavy rural labor for plowing and transport. After all, these companies have found a job former peasants. Before the mechanization of agricultural work to plow his allotment, the men had to be, “leaning on chapigi” go from 300 to 500 kilometers, and it is 15-20 days! Russian epic pre-Mongol period of the peasant, zapryagshem snake and pave the furrow to the Black Sea and drown in it a snake, is not an exaggeration. From Kiev to the sea is just 400 kilometers. Well, we should not forget about the country’s sovereignty.

The newspaper “Tan” in France wrote. “In France, where land ownership is fragmented to infinity between the individual owners, it is impossible to mechanise agriculture; Tips same industrializiruya agriculture, managed to solve the problem.”

On the eve of the first five-year plan for the country’s agriculture was a 25 million small farms (households), based on manual labor, then a few years later it was to create a large highly mechanized agricultural production. The gross output of the Soviet village in comparison with 1913 for 60 years, for example, has increased by 4.4 times, and labor productivity – up to 6 times. The Soviet Union became one of the first places in the world for food production: it produced more than any other country in the world wheat, rye, barley, sugar beet, potatoes and milk. In 1954-1961 gg. the USSR was the world’s highest average annual agricultural growth – 6%. Compared with the record year of 1913, when 250 kg of grain per head was made of the population of the USSR increased these rates 3 times. Developed and livestock. On 10/01/1966, for instance, in the USSR, there were 93.4 million head of cattle (in 1916 – 58.4 million.)., Including 40.1 million cows (1916 -. 28 , 8 mn), 59.5 million pigs (1916 -.. 23 mn), 135.3 million sheep and goats (1916 -… 89.7 million heads) [68]. In the early 80s the average yield in the USSR was 15 quintals per hectare [69].

This brief overview of the events associated with collectivization, shows that people had started and conducted collectivization, have both high-end executives a unique sense of feedback. They quickly responded to the character of the response of the system from the effects of their management decisions and quickly rebuilt, if they saw that the parcels are incorrect.

Success Industries

Despite the complications “of amputation surgery,” the patient’s condition began to improve. The course of industrialization is normalized and the country recovers its lost position as one of the industrial giants of Europe. This means that it immediately becomes very dangerous for the West, which is now starting to treat it more cautiously.

By the end of the 30s the USSR was one of the 3-4 countries capable of producing almost any kind of modern industrial products. Advances in the development of the industry allowed to refuse the export of grain for the purchase of machinery and industrial equipment. The Soviet Union ceased import of tractors and other agricultural machinery, the purchase of which is abroad in the previous five years cost $ 1.15 billion. Rubles.

Summing up the results of only one of the first five-year plan (1929-1932), Stalin said: “We did not have the steel industry, the foundations of industrialization We have it now that we did not have a tractor industry We have it now we do not…. was the automotive industry. we have it today. we did not have the machine tool. we do it is now “. Next, in the same way are called chemical, aviation industry, production of agricultural machines. In short, the Soviet leaders knew where does wealth as before os productivity growth, and we have always tried to snatch used among key parts technology.

The thirties were the time of the industrial breakthrough, which can not be denied. Russia quickly became one of the major industrial powers of the world. According to official statistics, from 1928 to 1955 the production of electricity increased 34 times, from 1928 to 1985 – 308 times. Growth of steel was 11 and 36 times, oil – 6 and 51 times, fertilizers – 88 and nearly 1,300.

Expenses for the import of ferrous metals decreased from 1.4 bln. Rub. in the first five years to 88 million. rubles in the second. Imports of machine tools for the engineering industry decreased in total amount of consumption of machines from 66% in 1928 to 14% in 1935. Overall, imports of machinery decreased in 1934-1935 the ten times compared to 1931 year.

Termination of import of tractors and cars and a significant reduction in imports of industrial equipment, ferrous and non-ferrous metals have reduced the debt on foreign loans to 6.3 billion. Rubles in 1931 to 400 mln. Rubles in 1936. If in the years 1931-1932 there was a significant excess of exports over imports, then in 1934 the Soviet Union had an active trade, and in 1935 – and an active balance of payments. It was promoted and rapid rise in gold production in the country. In 1936, the industry ranked first in the world. Due to the accumulation of gold and foreign exchange resources of the Soviet Union went mainly to the purchase of goods for cash and refused loans from foreign firms cause large overpayment of import orders.

At the same time taken to measure the concentration of funds in the hands of the state and stimulate productivity. In 1933, the foreign concessions were eliminated completely crowd out private capital. By 1934, the valuation of the value of wages and rates of Moscow has been fixed. In 1935, when the card system to keep the 6 consecutive years, was finally abolished – oil appeared in commercial stores.

In 1938-1940 was fast growth in living standards. The average salary increased by 35%, while the price is only 19% [70]. The number of university students has increased from 127 thousand. In the 1914/1915 academic year to 812 thousand. In the 1940/1941 year. It was a real industrial and educational revolution.

Stimulation of growth of labor productivity went in different directions. Persons who have been dismissed for violation of labor discipline evicted from departmental homes without providing other living space [71]. The walls of many plants adorned board of shame, satirical wall newspapers, bichuyushie “flyers” and deserters of the labor front. Due to the Stakhanovists in the first half of 1936 production quotas were increased by 13-47%. And then, in separate branches, they are increased by another 13-18% [72]. In fact, going Debugging low emission of socialism, or rather Russian mode of production, which will receive full clearance only after the war. [73]

Study, study and study again – METHOD OF STALIN

But why Stalin became the undisputed leader of the USSR? Calling empiricist Stalin, Trotsky repeatedly stressed that Stalin never had theoretically elaborated the strategic plan and the ability to foresee the immediate and the more remote consequences of their policies; he never came to develop their tactics of untested on a new economic theory object, but rather subordinated strategy tactical tasks dictated by the collision with the immediate and unforeseen difficulties, which resulted in his haphazard and devoid of scientific basis for policy. Only then we construct a theory. Stalin always fully explored the social system, not shied away from side to side, but only when convinced of the system’s inability to work to make decisions. On the contrary, all of these opposition groups differed in their plans adventurism and dogmatism.

Stalin unconsciously felt that dogmatic Marxism is not a theory, it is fit for use as prognoziruyushyaey models of reality and prefer to use their empirical observation of practice. Stalin built a theory consistently without jerks, he studied the system and it is not working out all possible options, he did not change the decision. Stalin preferred to wait until the end, as they say, to “roasted rooster,” and only then decide on the basis of an analysis of failures and successes, what to do. Stalin initially did not interfere in economic affairs, believing that Bukharin and Rykov long pull. But then, as the scab says pecked “roasted rooster” – famine in 1928.

Stalin understood that market-based NEP not only does not allow Russia to develop normally and to resist external threats, but also does not properly feed the country. Stalin realized that the NEP crisis-prone and out of these crises is no way out – agriculture requires the rapid increase in labor productivity and saturation technique and technology to industry needs, and for industrial development necessary to agricultural development. The circle is closed …


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